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Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of various macroeconomic and demographic fac-
tors on criminal activity in Kazakhstan. In my analysis I focus on average gravity and
grave crimes in addition to total crimes over the 2008-2016 period. Employing a fixed
effects model I show that share of women and age group of 15-19 years age positively
correlated, and shares of age group 0-14 and 50-64 years are negatively correlated both
with total and average grave crimes. In addition, share of age group of 65+ years
has a significant positive effect only for average grave crimes. On the other hand,
unemployment rate is very highly and negatively correlated with both total and aver-
age crime rates. GDP per capita is estimated to be the only important determinant
which negatively affects grave crimes. Furthermore, a-weights by locality population
are employed to obtain estimates generalized for Kazakhstan. The findings suggest
that women share positively affects all types of crime, both inflation and GDP per
capita are positively correlated with total crime rate, and net migration has a positive
effect on grave crimes. At the same time GDP per capita has a negative correlation
with grave crimes. Additionally, unemployment rate has negative impacts for total and
average gravity crimes but a positive impact for grave crimes. Moreover, age groups
0-14 and 50-64 years indicate negative influences on total and average gravity crimes,
age groups 15-19 and 65+ have negative impacts on grave crimes while share of age
group 35-49 positively correlates with it. Controlled year dummies are economically
and statistically significant both for locality and country level estimates which provides
evidence for a structural effect behind the recent increase in the crime rates.
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1 Introduction
The attempt to model criminal activity in an economics context is first tackled by
Becker (1968), in which he formulates supply and demand functions of crime utilizing the
price theory and subsequently derives a model of deterrence considering arrest probability
and size of punishment. However, in his model sanctions are assumed to be the same for any
crime type, such as burglary and murder, leading to distorted incentives. This issue, referred
as fundamental theoretical problem of “marginal deterrence”, is later addressed by Stigler
(1973). Levitt (2017) concludes that the Economics literature on causes and consequences
of crime is good at explaining the relationship between individuals’ decisions to engage in
criminal activity and costs of punishment. According to Merlo (2004), the literature also
provides useful insights to analyze alternative crime control policies.
The upward trend in criminal and violent acts leads to growing concern across many
countries. The most reliable indicator to compare crime rates around the world is the
homicide rate as definitions of other types of crime might differ significantly according to
various jurisdictions of countries. Figures A1-A3 in the Appendix provide the trends in
homicide rate in Americas, Asia, and Europe, respectively. In general the homicide rate in
Central Asia is lower than in Americas and Europe; however, it is the highest in Asia. It is
seen from Figure A2 in the Appendix that the homicide rate in Central Asia had decreased
dramatically in between 2010 and 2014. Surprisingly, the opposite trend was observed in
Kazakhstan (see Figure 1). The same pattern holds for total crime rates as well (while Russia,
Belarus, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan have downward trends, Kazakhstan has an upward trend,
source: the Secretariat of the Coordinating Council of Prosecutors General of the CIS).
According to the World Economic Forum’s ranking, Kazakhstan is in the 63rd place
among 137 countries in the level of organized crimes in 2017. Moreover, Kazakhstan had
the highest prison population rate in Asia in 2007 (see Table A1 in the Appendix). Despite
the fact that prison population in China is larger than in Kazakhstan, its prison population
rate is almost half as low as that of Kazakhstan (Institute of Criminal Policy). According to
the Secretariat of the Coordinating Council of Prosecutors General of the CIS, Kazakhstan
ranked 3rd in terms of overall crime rate among the CIS countries in 2013.
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Figure 1: Crime Rate Trends in Kazakhstan
Figure 1 presents the trend in crime rate in Kazakhstan since its independence. While
the crime rate decreased from 120 in 1992 to approximately 70 in 1997, there had been no
considerable changes afterwards up until 2009. The crime rate increased from 77 in 2009
to 211 in 2013. In accordance with the Concept of the Republic’s Legal Policy for 2010-
2020, the Generals Prosecutors Office has introduced informational platforms for electronic
registration of applications and reports of crimes. In addition, all internal affairs agencies
have been connected to a unique electronic system since 2011. An example is ”Biznes Tiregi”
for entrepreneurs. According to the Committee of Legal Statistics and Special Accounts, 335
entrepreneurs reported illegal inspections during the first months of the project in 2010 and
70% of them were verified. According to the statistics crime rate in Astana remained at the
same level in the first 13 years since it became a capital city while its population tripled.
After the implementation of the above mentioned informational platform, reported crimes
in Astana increased from 3 000 - 4 000 up to 15 000 per year.
The property crimes account for 63.6% of the total number of committed crimes, and
every second committed crime is a theft in Kazakhstan. While 34.4% of the crimes were
committed by people aged 21-29 years old, 27% committed by people aged 30-39 years old,
and 5.2% committed by juveniles in 2016 (the Committee of Legal Statistics and Special Ac-
counts, Qamqor). Theft can be perceived as a risky economic activity which helps individuals
obtain basic necessities. Large amount of property crimes can be explained by low marginal
costs since they are usually committed in crowded places whereby probability of getting
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arrested is low (Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999). House robberies might be widespread because
many new buildings having standardized locks appeared in the recent years in Kazakhstan,
and it is easier to break into these apartments.
This paper analyzes the relationship between criminal activity, and the macroeconomic
and demographic changes in Kazakhstan. The considerable fluctuations in the crime rate
coincide with the crisis and devaluation periods as seen in Figure 1. The economy of Kaza-
khstan heavily depends on oil and gas sector, and the low oil prices in 2014 led to a temporary
decline in economic growth of the country (see Figure A4 in the Appendix). The highest
rates of inflation were observed during the crisis period in 2008-2010. Economic downturns
in 2009 and 2015 also coincided with sizeable internal migration into metropolitan cities (the
Committee on Statistics).
There are many factors specified as the determinants of crime in the Economics lit-
erature such as population density, share of women, share of urban population, share of
diverse age groups, share of net internal migration, unemployment rate (see Figure A5 in
the Appendix), inflation rate (see Figure A6 in Appendix), Gini coefficient, GDP per capita,
spending on law enforcement, labor force participation rate, and ratio of consumption income
to subsistence level. A polychoric principal component analysis is utilized to reduce the di-
mensionality of the problem since some of these variables are highly correlated. Afterwards,
a fixed effects model is employed to uncover the effect of macroeconomic and demographic
variables on criminal activity.
The examination of the crime rates in different regions of Kazakhstan is warranted for
several reasons. First of all, the economic and social environments of two main cities (Astana
and Almaty) are very different from other regions (see Figures A8-A10 in the Appendix).
Second, identifying macroeconomic and demographic determinants of criminal activity can
help to implement new, or adjust existing policies. Finally, this is the first empirical research
on economics of criminal activity in Kazakhstan.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 is provides a literature review on economics
of crime. Section 3 presents the data and methodology. Section 4 provides the execution of
the polychoric principal component analysis. Section 5 presents the empirical results, which
is followed by the conclusion in Section 6.
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2 Literature Review
This section provides a detailed literature review on the determinants of criminal activ-
ity. The economics of crime traces its roots back to Becker’s seminal research in 1968 which
was the first attempt to model illegal activities in the domain of the price theory. Becker
derives a criminal equilibrium, which is reached whenever benefits exceed costs.
Allison (1972) analyzes the economic determinants of crime rate using specifications
based on commission of causes and prevention of violence, such as unemployment rate,
proportion of males in the population, education level, spending on culture, and share of
age group 15-24 years, etc. The effects of unemployment rate, share of men, and share of
age group 15-24 years conform with the postulation that they are positively correlated with
crime rates.
Krohn (1976) studies the impacts of inequality and unemployment levels on crime
rate in a cross-national framework. His study examines the hypothesis that nations having
high unemployment and inequality rates also have high crime rates. He includes homicide,
property, and total crime rates as functions of gross national product (GNP) per capita,
unemployment rate, and Gini coefficient. The results show that neither unemployment rate
nor economic inequality affects crime rate in the hypothesized direction. Both of them
indeed have negative impacts for property and total crime rates, and positive effects on
homicide rate. Furthermore, GNP per capita, which serves as a proxy for industrialization,
is positively correlated with crime rate.
It is plausible to assume that crime commitment acts as a form of employment generat-
ing “income” (Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001). However, criminal opportunity theorists
claim that people who spend more time outside of the household are more likely to commit
crimes. That is why an increase in unemployment rate does not necessarily lead to an in-
crease in crime rate (Cantor and Land, 1985; Cohen and Felson, 1979; Jackson, 1984). A
negative sign is more likely to appear in the context of violent and property crimes such as
robbery, larceny, burglary, and homicide while a positive impact is observed only for property
crimes (Cantor and Land, 1985).
Another contribution to the crime literature is by Entorf and Spengler (1998). They
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find that deterrence has a negative impact on property crime rate. The demographic factors
such as age and urbanization, and GDP per capita positively influence crime rates. Partic-
ularly, they find that share of age group 15-24 years is positively correlated with crime rate.
The effect of population density is insignificant in their research. They further find that over-
all unemployment rate has insignificant and ambiguous effect on crime rate; nevertheless,
youth unemployment positively affects crime rate.
Bechdolt (1975) investigates the relationship between macroeconomic indicators and
crime rates in big cities such as Los Angeles and Chicago, and finds that large population
and high employment densities positively affect crime rates.
Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999) investigate the problem in municipal cities of the United
States and find that there are 79% more violent crimes in metropolitan areas compared to
other cities. They support their findings with several strong arguments. Firstly, big cities
provide more pecuniary benefits for crime commitment. For instance, there are more rich
people in big cities whose house might be robbed. The authors utilize the victimization
results from 1989 and show that there is a greater return to crime in metropolitan areas.
Secondly, a larger population lowers the probability of getting arrested. Finally, there are
more female-headed households in metropolitan areas, and it is easier to break into their
houses. Due to the absence of data on female-headed households, I control for the share of
women population in my empirical analysis.
Amaral and Bhalotra (2017) show that there exists a statistically significant positive
correlation between women population and violent crimes.
Devine et. al. (1988) examine the effects of macroeconomic indicators and government
social policy on criminal behavior. In particular, they use unemployment and inflation rates,
and prison population as control variables. They run their models for different type of crimes
such as burglary, violent crimes, homicide, etc., and find that an increase in unemployment
rate has a positive effect on crime rate while the effect of prison population on crime is in
the opposite direction. Since criminals in Kazakhstan do not necessarily go to prison in their
own region, I can not include prison population in my analysis. Instead, I utilize spendings
on law enforcement as a proxy for the prison population.
Many studies examine the impact of inflation on crime rates and as expected find
7
Aigerim Zhumakanova Master’s Thesis
statistically significant positive influence of inflation on crime (for example Long and Witte,
1981).
Koenig (1991) provides empirical evidence for social control policies being more efficient
for little and average grave crimes such as theft and robbery, but not for violent crimes.
Howsen and Jarrel (1987) discuss the determinants of crime in Kentucky and whether
those determinants vary by types of crime. They control for various law enforcement vari-
ables such as number of police officers, apprehension rate, etc. as well as socioeconomic
determinants such as unemployment, median household income, poverty, education, age cat-
egories, and urbanization. While law enforcement variables negatively affect all types of
crime, poverty affects positively only property crime. Their findings suggest that a higher
unemployment level leads to increases in both robberies and burglaries.
Many researchers include poverty line or an inequality level indicator (like Gini co-
efficient) in their empirical models (Fajnzylber et al., 2002). According to Pleskovic and
Stiglitz (2010), the positive impact of inequality on crime rate leads to high social costs.
In the United States estimates show that social monetary and non-monetary costs of crime
account for approximately 3.8% of GDP.
Fajnzylber et. al. (2002) study the impact of inequality on homicide and robbery
rates among various countries. They utilize Gini coefficient, GDP growth rate, young male
population, number of police officers, etc. Their findings indicate a significant positive
correlation between homicide rate and Gini coefficient while the effect of GDP growth rate
on homicide rate is estimated to be negative.
3 Data and Methodology
My empirical model is flexible in terms of including most of the determinants discussed
in the economics of crime literature. I utilize the data from the Committee on Statistics,
the informational analytical system of the Ministry of National Economy, Taldau, and the
information service of the Committee of Legal Statistics and Special Accounts, Qamqor.
My sample covers the time period 2008-2016 for the 14 regions and 2 municipal cities of
Kazakhstan.
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The Committee on Statistics cover total crime rate panel and regional level macroeco-
nomic indicators such as GDP per capita (in thousands KZT), unemployment rate, inflation,
ratio of consumption income to subsistence level (which is based on the cost of a minimum
food basket and a fixed share - 40% - of spending on non-food items and services, source:
the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare), and spending on law enforcement (in millions
KZT). The data on population density, age composition, urban share, net migration, and
women share are taken from the annual demographic report of the Committee on Statis-
tics. The regional level data on different types of crime is obtained from the Committee
of Legal Statistics and Special Accounts, Qamqor. The informational analytical system of
the Ministry of National Economy, Taldau, provides data for Gini coefficient and labor force
participation rate. GDP per capita and spending on law enforcement are indexed using CPI
by taking year 2010 as the base.
Crimes in Kazakhstan are officially divided into four categories: little grave, average
grave, grave, and gravest crimes, based on the nature of crime and on the extent of the
danger it might cause to the public.
Little grave crimes include intentional acts for which the maximum penalty is two years
of imprisonment, also, careless acts for which the maximum penalty is five years of imprison-
ment. Examples of little grave crimes are thefts, robberies, and frauds. Average grave crimes
include intentional acts for which the maximum penalty is five years of imprisonment, also,
careless acts with maximum penalty more than five years of imprisonment. Examples are
illegal acquisition, transfer, sale, storage, transportation, or carrying of weapons and incite-
ment to suicide. Grave crimes are considered to be only intentional acts and include crimes
such as illegal production, sale, or transfer of drugs and intentional infliction of serious harm
to health. They lead for up to twelve years of imprisonment. Gravest crimes include only
intentional acts which lead to twelve or more years of imprisonment. Examples are terrorist
act and homicide (Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 1997). In other words,
the main difference in crime types are penalties, that is the duration of imprisonment, they
impose. I utilize average and grave crimes in addition to total number of crimes as the de-
pendent variables in my analysis. Little grave and gravest crime rates are very low: nineteen
little grave crimes and one gravest crime per 10 000 people on average per region.
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Little grave crimes are usually subject to underreporting issues. According to the
World Economic Forum’s ranking, Kazakhstan is in the 87th place on reliability of police
services among 137 countries. The Minister of Internal Affairs, Kalmukhanbet Kasymov,
claims that one of the reasons behind underreporting crimes could be inefficient work of
law enforcement agencies. In many cases law enforcement officials do not register little grave
crimes. The General’s Prosecutor’s Office in cooperation with the Ministry of Internal Affairs
implemented policies targeted on combating underreporting of crimes in 2011. As a result
the number of crimes reported involving law enforcement officials increased by 50% in 2012
(The Committee of Legal Statistics and Special Accounts).
The variables of interest contain almost all the macroeconomic and demographic indi-
cators provided as the determinants of crime in the literature. The regression model I utilize
is given by:
log(yit) = xitβit + αi + it, it ∼ N(0, σ2),
where yit denotes the crime rates by type (average grave and grave crimes as well as total
number of crimes), i represents 14 regions and 2 municipal cities, t is time, αi denotes fixed
effects, and it is the error term with mean 0 and variance σ
2.
The regressors (x’s) include:
1. Population density (per square km.)
2. Women share (percentage);
3. Urban share (percentage);
4. Share of age groups 0-14, 15-19, 20-34, 35-49, 50-64, and 65+;
5. Internal net migration share;
6. Total unemployment rate by age groups 15-19, 20-34, 35-49, 50-64, and 65+;
7. Gini coefficient;
8. Inflation rate;
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9. Labour force participation rate (percentage);
10. Log of GDP per capita (in year 2010 thousands KZT);
11. Ratio of average income per capita to subsistence level;
12. Log of spending on law enforcement (in year 2010 mln.s KZT);
13. Year dummies;
Figure 2 provides average total crime rates by region over the time period 2008-2016.
Astana and Almaty have the highest average crime rates, followed by Kostanay, Pavlodar,
and Aktobe regions. The lowest average crime rates are observed in Mangistau and South-
Kazakhstan regions.
Figure 2: Average Regional Crime Rates, 2008-2016
Figure 3 provides regional crime rate trends in between 2008 and 2016. It can be seen
that crime rates have upward trends in all the regions over the time. The highest level of
criminal activity for all 14 regions was observed in 2013, and for Astana and Almaty in 2015.
Tables 1 and 2 provide descriptive statistics for the variables of interest. It is seen that
minimum amount of total crimes committed by region by year per 10 000 people is 37 and
maximum is 509. Average grave crime exhibit a minimum of 20 and a maximum of 345
crimes, and grave crimes show a minimum of 6 and a maximum of 74 crimes. There are so-
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Figure 3: Regional Crime Rate Trends
me places with extremely low density (2.3) and other places with very high density (2 498).
The largest share of age group is 20-34 years old and the smallest one is 15-19 years old. We
can see that inflation has a significant gap between minimum, 3.4%, and maximum, 18.8%,
along with spending on law enforcement which indicates 391.5 mln.s KZT at the minimum
and 26 048 mln.s KZT at the maximum.
4 Polychoric Principal Component Analysis
My regression model, laid out in previous section, includes 13 determinants of crime
presented in the Economics literature. However some of these variables might be highly
intercorrelated leading to an over-controlling problem. That is why before proceeding to
estimation I execute a polychoric principal component analysis (PPCA) to reduce the di-
mensionality of the problem by eliminating highly intercorrelated variables (year dummies
and share of age groups are excluded from the PPCA). Tables A2-A7 in the Appendix provide
the steps of my PPCA estimation.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Total crime rate 144 153.8 93.42 37.63 509.3
Average grave crime 144 111.6 73.06 20.29 345.8
Grave crime 144 18.86 12.66 6.261 74.52
Population density 144 205.4 568.1 2.341 2498
Women share 144 51.78 1.092 50.01 54.50
Urban share 144 55.86 20.88 23.07 100
Share of Age group 0-14 144 24.57 4.950 18.03 35.26
Share of Age group 15-19 144 8.060 1.572 4.602 11.17
Share of Age group 20-34 144 26.11 2.961 21.52 36.12
Share of Age group 35-49 144 20.27 1.326 16.89 25.52
Share of Age group 50-64 144 13.95 2.897 8.922 20.67
Share of Age group 65+ 144 7.048 2.365 3.292 12.28
Net internal migration 144 0.0713 1.278 -1.831 8.818
Unemployment 144 5.533 0.668 4.600 7.700
Gini 144 0.249 0.0319 0.159 0.355
Inflation 144 7.829 2.575 3.400 18.80
LFPR 144 71.74 3.503 64.60 79.70
GDP per capita (thousands KZT) 144 1789 1307 356.7 6513
Ratio cons.income to sub.level 144 1.961 0.377 0.975 2.865
Spending on law enforc (mln.s KZT) 144 7405 6691 391.5 26048
Table A3 in the Appendix provides the eigenvalues which show the explanatory im-
portance of each factor. Figure 4 provides the relevant scree plot. A factor contains little
variance if it indicates a low eigenvalue. The aim is to determine which variables explain
factors with low eigenvalues then drop them. Using the ”scree” method, one can conclude
that 4 factors might be dropped. In order to identify which variables are highly correlated,
I refer to the polychoric correlation matrix provided in Table A2 in the Appendix.
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Table 2: Summary statistics: aweight
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Total crime rate 144 152.3 96.49 37.63 509.3
Average grave crime 144 110.1 75.08 20.29 345.8
Grave crime 144 21.03 14.04 6.261 74.52
Population density 144 246.3 643.4 2.341 2498
Women share 144 51.77 1.190 50.01 54.50
Urban share 144 54.81 22.68 23.07 100
Share of Age group 0-14 144 25.22 5.418 18.03 35.26
Share of Age group 15-19 144 8.117 1.597 4.602 11.17
Share of Age group 20-34 (reference group) 144 26.08 2.825 21.52 36.12
Share of Age group 35-49 144 19.99 1.444 16.89 25.52
Share of Age group 50-64 144 13.66 2.803 8.922 20.67
Share of Age group 65+ 144 6.933 2.299 3.292 12.28
Net internal migration 144 0.000728 1.159 -1.831 8.818
Unemployment 144 5.533 0.651 4.600 7.700
Gini 144 0.248 0.0315 0.159 0.355
Inflation 144 7.839 2.557 3.400 18.80
LFPR 144 71.12 3.581 64.60 79.70
GDP per capita (thousands KZT) 144 1532 1197 356.7 6513
Ratio cons.income to sub.level 144 1.956 0.403 0.975 2.865
Spending on law enforc (mln.s KZT) 144 6771 6911 391.5 26048
Population density is highly correlated with women share (0.5), urban share (0.7), net
migration (0.6), and log of spending on law enforcement (0.6). Log of spending on law
enforcement indicates high correlations with urban share (0.8), net migration (0.6), and
log of GDP per capita (0.9). Ratio of consumption income to subsistence level is highly
correlated with women share (0.6), urban share (0.6), and Gini coefficient (0.6). Therefore,
I exclude population density, log of spending on law enforcement, and ratio of consumption
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Figure 4: Screeplot for Eigenvalues
income to subsistence level. Looking at the correlation matrix remaining suspects are women
share and urban share. In order to exclude one of them I refer to Table A4 in Appendix and
see that women share has high coefficients for the first two factors while urban share indicates
importance only for the first one. Therefore I exclude urban share from my analysis.
After exclusion of four highly intercorrelated variables, namely population density,
urban share, ratio of consumption income to subsistence level, and log of spending on law
enforcement, I run another PPCA. Tables A5-A7 in Appendix provide the details for the
remaining model with 7 variables whereby all components explain a reasonable portion of
the variation. Figure 5 provides the relevant scree plot.
5 Estimation Results
After conducting the PPCA, I first estimate my fixed effects model on the remaining
variables. The results are provided in Table 3. According to my estimation, women share
positively affects total crime rates. This is in line with Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999) who
show that number of female-headed households is the most important explanation behind
urban crimes. Gender inequality in Kazakhstan is high, and this is an important factor
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Figure 5: Screeplot for Eigenvalues
behind domestic violence. About a quarter of Kazakh women aged 18 and over experienced
physical, psychological and sexual violence from their partners (Statistic Agency of Kaza-
khstan, Domestic violence report, 2016). On the other hand, Oaxaca et al. (2013) suggest
that being a woman increases the chances to receive a shorter sentence. A similar conclusion
is also documented by Mustard (2001). Becker’s (1968) rule suggests that the decision to
commit a crime is based on the costs and benefits. Women in this context have lower costs
from committing a crime. There is no data available on crime commitment based on gender
in Kazakhstan to check this hypothesis. However, this is a pressing topic for further research.
Results for unemployment indicate highly negative correlations with total and average
gravity crimes whereas this effect disappears for grave crimes. This is in favor of the criminal
opportunity hypothesis. The interaction terms between unemployment rate and age groups
demonstrate that an increase in the shares of unemployed people aged 15-19 or 50-64 years
old relative to reference group of 20-34 years old partly mitigates this negative correlation.
However, it is exacerbated by the increase in the share of unemployed in the 65+ age group.
Looking at different age groups, an increase in number of children decreases total and
average gravity crimes as expected since incidence of crime below age 14 is extremely low.
There is evidence for juvenile crimes (aged 15-19) for both total and average gravity crimes
16
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Table 3: Fixed effects model: estimation results
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES log(Total CR) log(Average grav CR) log(Grave CR)
women share 0.317** 0.171 0.330
(0.142) (0.155) (0.270)
Net migr -0.006 -0.015 0.021
(0.017) (0.018) (0.032)
Unemployment -3.489*** -4.986*** -2.681
(1.097) (1.194) (2.081)
Unemp15 19 0.047*** 0.070*** 0.046
(0.015) (0.016) (0.028)
Unemp35 49 0.048 0.063 0.011
(0.039) (0.043) (0.074)
Unemp50 64 0.153*** 0.207*** 0.053
(0.026) (0.028) (0.049)
Unemp65+ -0.069** -0.075** 0.095
(0.030) (0.033) (0.058)
Age0 14 -0.176** -0.245*** -0.145
(0.076) (0.083) (0.144)
Age15 19 0.110** 0.164*** 0.138
(0.046) (0.050) (0.088)
Age35 49 -0.221 -0.320 -0.184
(0.241) (0.262) (0.457)
Age50 64 -0.775*** -1.028*** -0.123
(0.130) (0.142) (0.247)
Age65+ 0.273 0.312* -0.360
(0.166) (0.181) (0.315)
Gini -1.372 -0.944 2.412
(0.941) (1.024) (1.785)
Inflation 0.010 0.010 -0.005
(0.015) (0.016) (0.028)
LFPR -0.001 -0.004 0.001
(0.007) (0.008) (0.014)
Log(GDP per cap) 0.143 0.054 -1.183***
(0.151) (0.164) (0.286)
Year2008 -1.127*** -1.163*** 0.258
(0.262) (0.285) (0.496)
Year2009 -1.293*** -1.350*** 0.303
(0.259) (0.282) (0.491)
Year2010 -1.285*** -1.272*** 0.241
(0.210) (0.228) (0.397)
Year2011 -0.784*** -0.653*** 0.584*
(0.169) (0.184) (0.321)
Year2012 -0.415*** -0.222 0.428
(0.142) (0.154) (0.269)
Year2013 -0.133 0.047 0.515**
(0.118) (0.128) (0.224)
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Table 3: Continued
(1) (2) (3)
log (Total CR) log (Average gravity CR) log( Grave CR)
Year2014 -0.132* 0.075 0.218
(0.077) (0.084) (0.146)
Year2015 -0.070 -0.136 0.135
(0.095) (0.104) (0.181)
Constant 2.711 17.371 11.630
(10.491) (11.417) (19.901)
Adj R-squared 0.940 0.947 0.501
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(statistically significant at 1% level), which supports the findings of Oliver (2002). Also,
share of age group of 50-64 years indicates a statistically significant negative sign. A possible
explanation might be the deterioration of physical abilities with age which in turn implies a
decrease in criminal activity. However, share of age group 65+ years indicate a significant
positive sign for average gravity crimes, which is difficult to explain.
One percentage point increase in GDP per capita leads to 1% decrease in grave crimes.
A higher GDP per capita is an indicator of higher production which implies increases in
amount of available jobs and wages. Therefore, incentive to commit grave crimes decreases.
Year dummies for 2008-2012 compared to 2016 indicate negative statistical significance
at 1% level for total and average gravity crimes. This might be related to the implementation
of policies in 2011 making reporting crimes easier and more effective. For example victims
can report incidents by text messages or online.
Controlling for a-weights by locality population, the estimation can be generalized for
the whole country. The results are provided in Table 4. Firstly, women share in population
significantly and positively affects not only total crime rate, but also average and grave crime
rates.
In comparison with regional estimates, net internal migration indicates statistical sig-
nificance with respect to grave crimes. If net internal migration increases by one percentage
point, grave crime rate increases by 7%. One explanation for this might be the fact that
labor competition in municipal cities is higher and migrants might commit crimes under
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financial distress. Moreover, the probability of deterrence would be lower due to high popu-
lation density. Another explanation might be committing a crime at a new place has a lower
cost since reputation is not tarnished.
The effect of unemployment for the general estimates is similar with the locality level
estimates for total and average gravity crimes except that unemployment at 65+ age group
does not exacerbate its negative overall effect. For grave crimes, unemployment rate and
share of unemployed people aged above 65 turns out to be significant (at 10% level). People
who can not find a job might get involved in criminal organizations since they do not require
education or experience, and award high income. Interaction terms for unemployment and
age groups 35-49 and 50-64 years indicate negative influences; however, they only mitigate
the overall positive effect of unemployment for grave crimes.
Share of age groups 0-14 and 50-64 years negatively correlate with total and average
gravity crimes which is in line with the hypothesis stated above about children and elderly
people. However, differently from regional level estimates, I observe a positive effect for
share of age group 35-49 years and negative effects for shares of age groups of 15-19 and 65
years old on grave crimes. It might be connected with the fact that committing grave crimes
requires physical strength.
A percentage point increase in inflation leads to a 3.3% increase in total crime rate.
When inflation is high, goods and services become more expensive and less accessible. There-
fore, people become more likely to commit little grave crimes like thefts.
Labor force participation rate and GDP per capita have negatively statistically signif-
icant estimates at 1% level for grave crimes. Higher rate of labor force participation and
higher GDP per capita imply higher levels of production. With more opportunities in labor
market, people might be less likely to commit grave crimes.
GDP per capita positively affects total crime rate at 10% significance level; however, it
is not economically significant (A 10% increase in real GDP per capita decreases total crime
rate by 0.5%).
Almost all year dummies have significant negative effects for total and average gravity
crimes compared to year 2016. The same reasoning should hold with regional estimates.
19
Aigerim Zhumakanova Master’s Thesis
Table 4: OLS: aweight
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES log(Total CR) log(Average grav CR) log(Grave CR)
Women share 0.137*** 0.137*** 0.390***
(0.034) (0.040) (0.060)
Net migr 0.019 0.020 0.071**
(0.020) (0.024) (0.036)
Unemployment -2.059** -2.645** 3.077*
(0.988) (1.159) (1.739)
Unemp15 19 0.048*** 0.061*** -0.015
(0.012) (0.014) (0.022)
Unemp35 49 -0.027 -0.043 -0.139**
(0.037) (0.043) (0.065)
Unemp50 64 0.112*** 0.158*** -0.086*
(0.029) (0.034) (0.051)
Unemp65+ 0.024 0.026 0.170***
(0.033) (0.038) (0.057)
Age0 14 -0.314*** -0.393*** 0.076
(0.071) (0.084) (0.126)
Age15 19 0.032 0.065 -0.207***
(0.034) (0.040) (0.060)
Age35 49 0.210 0.309 0.678*
(0.213) (0.250) (0.375)
Age50 64 -0.569*** -0.794*** 0.408
(0.147) (0.173) (0.259)
Age65+ -0.241 -0.263 -1.030***
(0.174) (0.204) (0.306)
Gini -0.531 -0.545 0.974
(0.904) (1.061) (1.591)
Inflation 0.033* 0.035 -0.014
(0.018) (0.021) (0.032)
LFPR 0.000 -0.000 -0.029***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
Log(GDP per cap) 0.059* 0.055 -0.259***
(0.033) (0.039) (0.059)
Year2008 -1.511*** -1.752*** 0.985**
(0.227) (0.266) (0.399)
Year2009 -1.534*** -1.806*** 0.969**
(0.216) (0.253) (0.380)
Year2010 -1.509*** -1.704*** 0.829***
(0.172) (0.202) (0.302)
Year2011 -1.011*** -1.092*** 1.028***
(0.141) (0.165) (0.248)
Year2012 -0.570*** -0.548*** 0.458**
(0.121) (0.142) (0.212)
Year2013 -0.226** -0.184 0.405**
(0.109) (0.128) (0.193)
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Table 4: Continued
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES log(Total CR) log(Average grav CR) log(Grave CR)
Year2014 -0.245*** -0.142 0.055
(0.074) (0.087) (0.130)
Year2015 -0.265** -0.393*** 0.177
(0.112) (0.132) (0.197)
Constant 8.894 11.265 -24.146**
(6.051) (7.101) (10.650)
Adj R-squared 0.926 0.921 0.734
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
However, almost all year dummies for grave crimes are positively significant though decreas-
ing over the time. This implies a structural decrease in grave crimes over the years.
Even after decreasing the dimensionality of the problem at hand via PPCA, I am
still left with macroeconomic variables such as inflation, GDP per capita, and labor force
participation rate, in addition to overall and age specific unemployment variables. Given very
high estimates of R2 and insignificance of some of these macroeconomic variables, I might
still have an over-parametrization problem. In order to address this, dropping age specific
unemployment variables, I follow a general-to-specific modelling approach and eliminate the
most insignificant variables one-by-one in each consecutive estimation round. Eventually, I
add back age specific unemployment variables to get my parsimonious model.
Starting with the locality level regression, labor force participation rate, net internal
migration, Gini coefficient, and inflation rate are excluded sequentially to obtain my parsi-
monious model. The estimates are given in Table 5. I then conduct the same analysis for
the generalized regression and drop labor force participation rate, Gini coefficient, and net
internal migration sequentially. The estimates are given in Table 6.
Findings from the parsimonious model at the locality level and the country level are
virtually the same with previous estimates given in Tables 3 and 4, respectively, except
unemployment for the age group 50-64 years loses its significance for grave crimes.
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Table 5: Fixed effects: parsimonious model
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES log(Total CR) log(Average grave CR) log(Grave CR)
Women share 0.334** 0.194 0.300
(0.140) (0.153) (0.266)
Unemployment -3.485*** -5.090*** -2.603
(1.081) (1.175) (2.049)
Unemp15 19 0.049*** 0.071*** 0.040
(0.014) (0.016) (0.027)
Unemp35 49 0.042 0.064 0.020
(0.038) (0.041) (0.072)
Unemp50 64 0.150*** 0.204*** 0.053
(0.025) (0.027) (0.047)
Unemp65+ -0.054* -0.064** 0.072
(0.028) (0.031) (0.053)
Age0 14 -0.186** -0.256*** -0.118
(0.075) (0.081) (0.142)
Age15 19 0.115** 0.166*** 0.132
(0.045) (0.049) (0.085)
Age35 49 -0.201 -0.345 -0.203
(0.232) (0.253) (0.440)
Age50 64 -0.760*** -1.013*** -0.131
(0.126) (0.137) (0.239)
Age65+ 0.200 0.263 -0.246
(0.152) (0.165) (0.287)
Log(GDP per cap) 0.119 0.054 -1.171***
(0.144) (0.157) (0.273)
Year2008 -1.171*** -1.170*** 0.347
(0.253) (0.276) (0.480)
Year2009 -1.316*** -1.345*** 0.315
(0.254) (0.276) (0.482)
Year2010 -1.297*** -1.264*** 0.249
(0.206) (0.224) (0.391)
Year2011 -0.812*** -0.665*** 0.617*
(0.166) (0.180) (0.314)
Year2012 -0.449*** -0.246* 0.454*
(0.135) (0.147) (0.256)
Year2013 -0.170 0.014 0.535***
(0.106) (0.115) (0.200)
Year2014 -0.144* 0.065 0.224
(0.075) (0.082) (0.142)
Year2015 -0.026 -0.089 0.117
(0.057) (0.062) (0.109)
Constant 2.763 17.043 4.851
(10.162) (11.048) (19.261)
Adj R-squared 0.939 0.946 0.505
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: OLS: aweight (parsimonious model)
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES log(Total CR) log(Average grave CR) log(Grave CR)
Women share 0.138*** 0.137*** 0.366***
(0.033) (0.039) (0.062)
Unemployment -1.778* -2.349** 4.078**
(0.941) (1.103) (1.766)
Unemp15 19 0.046*** 0.058*** -0.034
(0.012) (0.014) (0.022)
Unemp35 49 -0.038 -0.053 -0.158**
(0.035) (0.041) (0.066)
Unemp50 64 0.112*** 0.157*** -0.061
(0.028) (0.033) (0.053)
Unemp65 0.025 0.026 0.108*
(0.031) (0.036) (0.058)
Age0 14 -0.302*** -0.380*** 0.149
(0.069) (0.081) (0.130)
Age15 19 0.021 0.053 -0.251***
(0.032) (0.038) (0.060)
Age35 49 0.271 0.371 0.714*
(0.203) (0.238) (0.381)
Age50 64 -0.567*** -0.794*** 0.243
(0.144) (0.169) (0.270)
Age65 -0.258 -0.276 -0.687**
(0.163) (0.192) (0.307)
Inflation 0.030* 0.033 -0.008
(0.018) (0.021) (0.033)
Log(GDP per cap) 0.063* 0.060 -0.238***
(0.032) (0.037) (0.060)
Year2008 -1.514*** -1.755*** 1.070**
(0.225) (0.263) (0.422)
Year2009 -1.537*** -1.807*** 1.005**
(0.214) (0.251) (0.401)
Year2010 -1.505*** -1.700*** 0.839***
(0.170) (0.199) (0.319)
Year2011 -1.014*** -1.094*** 1.040***
(0.140) (0.164) (0.262)
Year2012 -0.576*** -0.555*** 0.451**
(0.119) (0.140) (0.224)
Year2013 -0.235** -0.193 0.385*
(0.108) (0.127) (0.203)
Year2014 -0.248*** -0.145* 0.057
(0.073) (0.085) (0.137)
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Table 6: Continued
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES log(Total CR) log(Average grav CR) log(Grave CR)
Year2015 -0.256** -0.385*** 0.132
(0.111) (0.130) (0.208)
Constant 7.703 9.969 -29.306***
(5.707) (6.691) (10.717)
Adj R-squared 0.927 0.923 0.702
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
6 Conclusion
Identifying the factors which have impact on crime rate is important for the economy
of Kazakhstan as it can help develop and implement policies and programs targeted on com-
bating crime. The current paper is the first empirical research on that topic in Kazakhstan.
Using the Committee on Statistics data, informational analytical system of the Min-
istry of National Economy, Taldau, and the information service of the Committee of Legal
Statistics and Special Accounts, Qamqor, I estimate the influence of various macroeconomic
and demographic indicators on different types of crime in Kazakhstan during the period
2008-2016.
The results of the polychoric principal component analysis showed that not all the
determinants listed in the literature can be used in the context of Kazakhstan. Particularly,
I exclude four variables: population density, urban population, ratio of consumption income
to subsistence level, and spending on law enforcement.
Afterwards fixed effect models are utilized. At locality level the main factors affecting
the crime rates are share of women, unemployment rate, age composition, GDP per capita,
and year dummies. An increase in the share of women leads to higher rates of total crime.
The effect of unemployment is negative to a greater extent with different signs for interaction
terms with age mitigating or exacerbating this effect. Particularly, GDP per capita has a
negative correlation with grave crimes. Significant estimates for the year dummies 2008-2013
show that some portion of the changes in crime rates are structural.
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Controlling for a-weights generalize the findings for the whole Kazakhstan. My findings
suggest that net migration and inflation have positive effects on grave crime. Unemployment
rate is negatively correlated with total and average gravity crimes while the effect for grave
crimes is estimated to be positive. Moreover, the influence of age groups 0-14 and 50-64
years on total and average gravity crimes are negative whereas age groups 15-19 and 65+
years indicate statistically significant negative signs. Also, age group 35-49 years positively
influences grave crimes. GDP per capita have a small positive effect on total crime and is
negatively correlated with grave crime. Almost all year dummies support the hypothesis
that a significant reason behind current increase in crime rate in Kazakhstan is structural.
Utilizing general-to-specific method I check if my estimates suffer from over-parametrization
problem in my analysis. Particularly, I drop age specific unemployment variables and step-by-
step exclude least significant variables. Then I include age specific unemployment variables
back into the model. The estimates from this parsimonious specification are virtually the
same with my regular estimates, showing no evidence for over-parametrization.
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8 Appendix
Table A1: Prison Population Rates per 100 000 in Asia, 2007
Kazakhstan 366
Israel 313
Kyrgyzstan 283
Singapore 267
Thailand 253
Mongolia 250
Turkmenistan 224
Iran 222
Saudi Arabia 178
Lebanon 159
Tajikistan 149
Malaysia 147
Source: European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, 2010
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Table A3: Eigenvalues
k Eigenvalues Proportion explained Cum. explained
1 4.275 0.389 0.389
2 1.803 0.164 0.553
3 1.333 0.121 0.674
4 0.993 0.090 0.764
5 0.895 0.081 0.845
6 0.637 0.058 0.903
7 0.526 0.048 0.951
8 0.206 0.019 0.970
9 0.172 0.016 0.985
10 0.121 0.011 0.996
11 0.039 0.004 1
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Table A4: Scoring Coefficients
Variable Coeff. 1 Coeff. 2 Coeff. 3
Population density 0.392 -0.109 -0.213
Women share 0.317 0.384 -0.179
Urban share 0.455 -0.043 -0.052
Net migration 0.324 -0.239 0.004
Unemployment rate -0.003 -0.197 -0.731
Gini coefficient 0.178 0.580 -0.059
Inflation 0.057 -0.031 0.213
Labor force participation rate -0.136 -0.054 0.427
log(GDP per capita) 0.325 -0.342 0.302
Ratio of cons.income & subs.level 0.333 0.435 0.229
log(spend on law enforc.) 0.404 -0.310 0.104
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Table A6: Eigenvalues
k Eigenvalues Proportion explained Cum. explained
1 1.740 0.249 0.249
2 1.368 0.196 0.444
3 1.138 0.163 0.607
4 0.965 0.138 0.744
5 0.891 0.127 0.872
6 0.562 0.080 0.952
7 0.335 0.048 1
Table A7: Scoring Coefficients
Variable Coeff. 1 Coeff. 2 Coeff. 3
Women share 0.591 -0.291 0.119
Net migr 0.415 0.480 -0.282
Unemployment 0.033 -0.234 -0.750
Gini 0.497 -0.422 0.282
Inflation 0.085 0.188 0.409
LFPR -0.296 0.182 0.310
log(GDP per capita) 0.369 0.619 -0.032
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Figure A1: Intentional Homicide Rates in Americas, 2003-2015
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Homicide Database
Figure A2: Intentional homicide rates in Asia, 2003-2015
Source: UNODC homicide database
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Figure A3: Intentional Homicide Rates in Europe, 2003-2015
Source: UNODC Homicide Database
Figure A4: GDP Growth Rate in Kazakhstan, 1991-2014
Source: National Bank of Kazakhstan
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Figure A5: Unemployment Rate in Kazakhstan, 1991-2017
Source: National Bank of Kazakhstan
Figure A6: Inflation Rate in Kazakhstan, 1991-2014
Source: National Bank of Kazakhstan
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Figure A7: Exchange Rate in Kazakhstan, 1991-2014
Source: National Bank of Kazakhstan
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Figure A8: Real Average Income per Capita by Region (2010=100)
Source: The Committee on Statistics
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Figure A9: Regional Population Trends
Source: The Committee on Statistics
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Figure A10: Real Spendings on Law Enforcement per Capita by Region
(2010=100)
Source: The Committee on Statistics
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